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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the evolution of the U.S. trade relations with
Latin America, investigating the possible path that these relations will
take in the future. The data analyzed show that during the last 15 years or
so there has been no significant loss in the U.S. aggregate competitive
position in Latin America. However, there has been a significant change in
the composition of U.S. exports to the Latin American nations. The paper
also deals with issues related to direct foreign investment in Latin
America, comparing the importance of the U.S. and other nations. Finally,
the role of international trade in the solution of the current Latin
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I. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of the U.S. in the
development of Latin America's international trade relations. In particular
the paper investigates the behavior of trade flows between the U.S. and the
Latin American nations in the last 15 years or so, and analyzes the possible
path that these trade relations will take in the future. In doing this,
special emphasis is placed on any possible changes in the directions of
trade in Latin America, scrutinizing whether there has been or will possibly
be, a significant increase in south-south trade, and if new trade partners
such as Japan and the newly industrialized countries of Southeast Asia have
displaced the more traditional Latin American trade partners (i.e., the
U.S). The paper also deals with issues related to direct investment in
Latin America, comparing the importance of the U.S. and other nations.
Finally, the role of international trade in the solution of the current
Latin American debt crisis, and in the resumption of sustained growth in the
region is also discussed. An important, indeed crucial, issue relates to
the future evolution of the current protectionist mood in the U.S. and much
of the developed world.
As we enter the final years of the l980s, policy issues related to the
volume and direction of U.S. international trade have become increasingly2
important. In particular, a number of specialinterest lobbies have argued
with alarming insistence that the "increased competition" byother countries
to capture foreign markets, and unfair trade practicessuch as dumping and
export subsidy schemes not sanctioned bythe GATT, have been responsible for
the mounting trade deficits and for the "loss of jobs"in the U.S. Several
important questions emerge here: the first is:What is exactly meant by
"loss of U.S. international competitiveness?" Second, given ananswer to
the above question, has the U.S. indeed lost competitiveness?Third, what
are the future prospects for the U.S. traderelations? And finally, what
and to whom will the U.S. export in the future, and fromwhich countries
will U.S. imports come from? The present paper will dealwith these ques-
tions from the perspective of the U.S. trade relationswith Latin America.
The future evolution of the volume and directions of tradeis also of
paramount importance for the Latin Americancountries. In the early 1980s,
after two decades of sustained economic growth averaging approximatelysix
percent per annum, Latin America entered a periodof severe adjustment. The
need for this adjustment resulted, to a large extent, from a seriesof major
shocks -- bothexogenous and policy-induced -- thatgreatly disturbed the
region's economy. The principal exogenous shocks werethe oil price
increases of 1973-74 and 1979-80, the drastic deterioration ofthe terms of
trade experienced after 1980, and the steep rise of world interest ratesin
1980-82 which provoked a major increase in the debt service burden. Atthe
policy level, the substantial increases in government expenditureand fiscal
deficits, and the economic liberalization reforms attempted by someof these
countries, as well as general and very significant increases inexternal
indebtedness, constituted the most important events. Some countrieswent
from being highly praised "economic miracles" to "international pariahs."3
Others, which in the mid- to late-1970s were flooded with abundant foreign
exchange -- obtainedmainly through the exportation of petroleum --have
experienced very severe difficulties servicing their foreign debt. The
region is at this moment still struggling to overcome the worst recession
since the l930s. As it slowly emerges from the crisis, it finds a substant-
ial portion of its export earnings mortgaged for the foreseeable future to
service the accumulated external debt, and a general scarcity of additional
external funds.
There is little doubt that a permanent solution of Latin America's
current crisis, and the resumption of sustained growth will require a major
effort to increase exports and to enhance the role of the external sector as
a source of foreign exchange earnings. In that regard, it is especially
important to determine whether the Latin American countries efforts to
increase their exports will be frustrated by protectionist policies
implemented by the industrialized nations. Indeed, the Latin American
countries' efforts to adjust and put the crisis behind them would receive a
severe blow if the current protectionist lobby scores victories in the U.S.
and European countries. Increased protectionism could take two forms: the
enactment of protective legislation, or the stepping up the already
significant non-tariff barriers existing in these countries.
Some of the sections of this paper are largely descriptive; this has
been deliberate, since an important purpose of this study is to scrutinize
the data, and document and interpret the recent history of the Latin Ameri-
can trade relations with the U.S. In spite of the descriptive tone of some
sections, the paper as a whole makes a number of analytical points related
to the nature of these external relations. The plan of the paper is as fol-
lows: In Section II some of the main current characteristics of the Latin4
American economies are briefly discussed, and the way in which the region's
external sector policies have evolved is discussed. Section III deals with
Latin American imports. Here we investigate the recent behavior of the
region's degree of openness, aggregate imports, and origin of imports atthe
disaggregated level. In this section it is shown that much of the region's
efforts to cope with the debt crisis have been translated in a very
substantial drop in the real value of imports. This section contains
massive amounts of data on how much, what and from whom 16 Latin American
countries import. Emphasis is placed on analyzing the evolution of the U.S.
share of the value of Latin America's imports, and of the changing composi-
tion of the region's imports from the U.S. It is shown here that when the
constant-market-share criterion is used there is no support for the
contention of a recent loss of aggregate U.S. competitiveness in Latin
America. The data, however, do show that there has been a change in the
composition of Latin America's imports from the U.S. The share of
traditional manufacturing has declined, while primary products and
technology intensive manufactures have experienced an increased presence
among the region's imports.
Section IV deals with Latin America's exports, and investigates their
recent behavior and composition. It is shown that in spite of a series of
corrective measures taken by these countries since the debt crisis, for the
region as a whole the recent evolution of the (real) value of exports has
been very disappointing. An important issue analyzed in this section is
related to the role of protectionism in the industrialized countries on the
possible access of Latin American products to those markets. Using recent
data on nontariff barriers it is shown that the extent of these nontariff
impediments to trade are much more generalized than previously thought. It5
is then argued that only to the extent that there is a drastic change in the
protectionist mood in the industrial world will it be possible for Latin
America's trade to gain in prominence.
Section V deals with commercial policy and protectionism in Latin
America. Here it is shown how in the late 1960s and l970s, after the hey-
days of the import substitution development strategy, most of the Latin
American countries slowly began to reduce their impediments to trade. This
trend, which was particularly marked in the Southern Cone countries in the
late l970s, was reversed in the l980s when, as a consequence of the debt
crisis, most of these countries resorted to the imposition of controls to
reduce imports. In this section we also discuss the role of nontariff
barriers in Latin America. Section VI deals with exchange rate policies.
Here two main issues are addressed. First, we look at the behavior of real
exchange rates in these nations and argue that the fairly generalized
tendency towards overvaluation in the late 1970s and early 1980s greatly
contributed to the poor behavior of the region's external sector. Second,
we point out how the existence of multiple nominal exchange rates and of
pervasive parallel markets for foreign exchange have played an important
protective role in these countries. Section VII deals with direct invest-
ment. Here the historical evidence is analyzed and it is argued that in the
next few years direct investment will probably be one of the more important
sources of external financing that these countries will have. This, of
course will require some creative rethinking of the current regional policy
on direct foreign investment and related issues. Finally, Section VIII
deals with possible future evolution of U.S. -Latin American trade relations,
and contains the concluding remarks.6
II. The Latin American Economies: A Brief Overview
Table 1 contains data on a number of economic indicators for16 Latin
American countries.1 As may be seen there are very markeddifferences
across the countries of the region, both in terms of income per capita,
recent growth performance and inflation. This, of course, makes generaliza-
tions very difficult; in fact there isn't such a thing as "the representa-
tive" Latin American country. For this reason, in the rest of this paper
the analysis will generally provide data on these 16 countries.
Although today the countries of Latin America are economically very
diverse, and stand at different junctions of their development paths, they
do share a common evolution of their policies towards the external sector.
In the rest of this section, and in order to put things in perspective, we
provide a very brief description of the role of the external sectorin the
development of the Latin American countries.
11.1 Latin American Development and External Sector Policies
Until the 1930s the external sector in the great majority of the Latin
American countries was highly opened; exchange controls were almost
nonexistent, import tariffs were very low, and the "rules of the game" were
strictly followed. The great depression, with its devastatingeffect on the
region's economies, put an end to all of that; it marked the beginningof an
epoch of import substitution andprotectionism.2
During the l95Os and 1960s, under the intellectual leadershipof the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), and its charis-
matic Secretary General Raul Prebisch, most of the Latin American countries
embarked on ambitious industrialization programs based on import
substitution. This strategy was based on the idea that high import tariffs
and other impediments to international trade would provide temporary protec-7
tionto the local industries and help them develop. In theory, according to
this approach after some time the domestic firms would have "learned", and
protection would not be necessary any more (Prebish 1984). Things, however,
did not work out as predicted by the theory, and protection became a
permanent feature in the region. As a result, in most of these countries
the industrial sector that was developed under the barriers of protection
was largely inefficient, using highly capital intensive techniques (Krueger
1983).
During the 1950s and first half of the l960s it became apparent that
the import substitution strategy was losing dynamism. Although the easier
and more obvious imports had already been substituted, these countries
remained highly "dependent" on imported intermediate inputs and capital
goods. At the same time the highly overvalued domestic currencies conspired
against the development of a dynamic export sector, with the consequent
scarcity of foreign exchange.3
During the late l960s a reaction against excessive protectionism
started to take place, and a number of countries -- Colombiabeing the
premier example -- movedtowards export promotion schemes (Diaz Alejandro
1976). Also during this period some serious efforts were made to create
common markets comprising subgroups of Latin American countries. In that
respect the creation of Andean group and the Central American Common Market
were particularly important. Although in some regards these integrationist
schemes were successful, they did not turn around the region's economies,
and in many cases the external sector --andthe excessive protectionism --
wasstill seen as the "weak link" by most analysts.4
During the second half of the l970s a fairly generalized recognition of
the benefits of export promotion had developed, and most countries tended to8
rationalize their external sector. In the countries of the SouthernCone
(Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) massive reforms aimed at opening upthese
economies were implemented: tariffs were reduced, and exchangecontrols
disappeared. After an initial successful period these openingreforms fal-
tered, and in the early l980s these countries, as the restof Latin America,
entered into a major recession.5 The 1980 crisis forced the LatinAmerican
countries to greatly reduce their imports and to improve their current
account balances. As is discussed in Section V, most countriesresorted to
increased import controls in their attempts to improve their foreign
accounts.
III. The Structure and Evolution of Imports in Latin America
The purpose of this section is to analyze the recent evolution of
imports in Latin America, placing special emphasis on therole of the U.S.
as a trade partner. An important question addressed here iswhether the
available data show any trend in the value of Latin America's imports from
the U.S. The analysis focuses on three important aspects of this problem.
We first look at the historical evolution of the dollar value of interna-
tional trade (imports and exports) in Latin America. Second, we analyze the
evolution of the degree of openness of the countries in the region, and we
also look in detail at the behavior of the trade and current account
balances. And third, we analyze the distribution of Latin American imports
both across countries and across productive sectors, looking in detail at
the U.S. and other countries shares of the value of Latin American imports.
111.1 Imports. Exports and the Degree of Openness
Tables 2 and 3 contain data on the dollar value of imports and exports
for fourteen Latin American countries between 1965 and 1985. In Table 4 the9
current account balances for these countries are presented. Table 5
presents the evolution of an indicators of openness defined as the ratio of
total trade -- importsplus exports --to CDP.
Table 2 on imports is extremely revealing, showing that for most
countries the (nominal) dollar value of imports peaked between 1980 and
1982, only to experience a dramatic fall in the years following the eruption
of the debt crisis. As can be seen, in every single country the (nominal)
dollar value of imports in 1985 was well below its 1980 level. For these 14
countries as a whole the (nominal) dollar value of imports was in 1985 36%
below its 1980 value. Moreover, when expressed in real dollar terms, 1985
total imports are 45 percent below their 1980 value!6 0 course, this
mainly reflects the reduction in imports required by the adjustment programs
implemented by these countries after the 1982 debt crisis.7 Table 3 on the
value of exports also reflects the effects of the adjustment programs. In a
number of these countries --Argentina,Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico --the
value of exports was in 1985 significantly above its 1980 value. This was
achieved in spite of the fact that for most of the countries in the region
the international prices of their exports declined quite substantially
during the period (see Section IV of this paper).
Table 4 on the current account balances also portrays in a very vivid
way the impact of the crisis on the region's external sector, and the
substantial efforts the region has made to adjust to the new post-1982
reality. In 11 out of the 14 countries the current account balance experi-
enced a quite substantial improvement between 1980 and 1985. Moreover, five
of these countries --Argentina,Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay -- turned
trade deficits into fairly large trade surpluses during this period.10
Table 5 contains data on an indicator of these economies degree of
openness: the ratio of total trade (imports plus exports)to GDP. Although
the behavior of this index differs from country-to-country, it is still
possible to draw some general pattern of behavior. According tothis index
there was a fairly significant increase in the degree of openness in the
l970s. This general move towards greater openness is revealed both when
1975 is compared with 1970 as when 1980 is compared with 1970. For example,
between 1970 and 1975 the index of total trade to GDP experienced signifi-
cant increases in 12 of the 13 countries that have data. During this period
in 9 out of the 13 countries that have data, the ratio of total trade to GDP
increased by at least 5 percentage points, and in two other countries it
increased by more than two percentage points. Only in the cases of Bolivia
and Costa Rica did this index decline. Moreover, the ratio of imports to
GDP tells very much the same story. Only for the cases of Bolivia, Costa
Rica and Ecuador it declined between 1970 and1980.8 Generally speaking the
available evidence strongly indicates that the 1970s was a decade where most
of the nations of Latin America became more open to the rest of the world.
In fact, as is shown in Section V below, this is reflected by the evolution
of the level of import tariffs and other impediments to trade during this
period.
As Table 5 very clearly shows, during the first half of the l980s the
trend towards greater openness was drastically reversed, with the openness
index exhibiting a sharp drop for most countries. This, of course, was
partially the consequence of the crisis and adjustment policies that
required a significant cut in imports. As can be seen in Table 5, in the
case of the total trade ratio, in 9 of the 14 countries there was a decline
between 1980 and 1985. The imports ratios also experienced significantii
declines in 12 of the 14 countries; in most of these countries the 1985
imports ratios were significantly below their 1970 and 1975 values.
111.2 The Composition of Imports
In this section we look at the evolution of different countries shares
of the value of Latin America's imports both at an aggregate and disaggre-
gate level. This analysis is particularly important to assess whether the
U.S. has experienced a loss in its competitive position in the region. In
fact, according to the so-called constant-market-share criterion, a
country's degree of competitiveness in a particular market will remain
constant (decrease) if its share of that region's imports remains constant
(decreases).1° However, the discussion that follows should be interpreted
with some caution, since these are shares of the U.S. dollar value of
imports, and are thus influenced by changes in the real value of the dollar.
In particular, a real appreciation of the dollar will result in an increase
in these market shares, even if the quantities imported from the U.S. and
other countries remain constant. Naturally, a real depreciation of the
dollar will have the opposite effect: it will increase the market shares
even if quantities imported are not affected.11 In spite of this
shortcoming, however, the analysis of the evolution of market shares is
quite revealing. Moreover, these shares are the only indicators on the
distribution of Latin American imports that can be constructed with the
available data.
111.2.1 Aggregate Trends
Tables 6, 7, and 8 contain data on the percentage distribution of the
value of imports for 16 Latin American countries for 1977-85. These data
give us information on what fraction of the U.S. dollar value of each of
these countries' imports came from industrialized countries, what share caine12
from oil exporting LDCs and what share from nonoil exportingLDCs. For the
case of industrialized countries an additionalrefinement has been made by
explicitly identifying the U.S. and the Japaneseshares. Since a few minor
trade partners -- mainlyfrom the Soviet bloc --havebeen excluded, the sum
of these shares doesn't necessarily add up to one hundred. Figures1, 2 and
3 depict the U.S. share of these countries' imports forthe same period.
Several facts emerge from these tables and figures. First,the
distribution of imports varies significantly across countries.For example,
while in some of them the U.S. share in total importsis in the 20 to 25
percent range (i.e., Argentina, Chile,Bolivia), in others it is
approximately 40 to 50 percent (or more), whilestill in others it is below
10 percent (i.e., Uruguay). Second, and more important,these tables --and
in particular these diagrams -- showvery clearly that for the great major-
ity of the Latin American countries there havebeen no perceptible changes
in the proportion of imports coming from theU.S.12 Third, even a very
detailed analysis at the country level reveals that there is noclear common
pattern in the shares behavior during the yearsimmediately following the
debt crisis. However, in some of the large and medium sizecountries either
in 1982 or 1983 there is a slight drop in the share of imports comingfrom
the industrialized countries (Argentina, 1982; Brazil, 1982;Chile 1982 and
1983; Mexico, 1983). In Argentina, Mexico and Venezuelathere is also a
decline in the U.S. share in either 1982 and 1983. Finally (fourth),in 11
of these countries' there was a slight increase in theindustrialized
countries market share in 1985 (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Hondurasand
Bolivia). Moreover in the cases of Brazil, Mexico, Colombia,Ecuador, El
Salvador, Honduras and Bolivia the U.S. share of imports experiencedsome13
increase between 1984 and 1985.
An important question is whether this lack of trend in the U.S. share
of the Latin American imports market is only a recent phenomenon (i.e.,
post-1977), or if it reflects a longer run phenomenon. In order to investi-
gate this issue, trend regressions for 1970-83 were estimated both for the
region as a whole and for each of the 16 countries in Table 1. The results
obtained were quite definitive, showing that for the region as a whole there
has been no statistically significant change in the U.S. market share of
aggregate Latin American imports. At the individual country level there
were no changes in nine cases, while in two countries (Mexico and Peru)
there has been an increase in the U.S. share; with 5 countries showing a
decline (Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Honduras and Nicaragua). Naturally,
the Nicaraguan trend responding mainly to political reasons.13 Surprisingly
perhaps, according to this statistical analysis the U.S. market share of
these 16 Latin American countries was not sensitive to contemporaneous or
lagged fluctuations in the real value of the dollar. In Appendix A, we
present the detailed results from this regression analysis.
This aggregate market share analysis, then, suggests quite categori-
cally that for the vast majority of these countries the popular contention
that the U.S. has experienced a major loss of its degree of competitiveness
in the region is not supported by the data. What has happened is something
very different: the value --bothnominal and real --of the U.S. exports to
Latin America has declined quite severely since 1980. This, however, has
little to do with loss of aggregate competitiveness; it is simply the result
of the debt crisis and the accompanying monumental fall in Latin America's
total imports during the period. The region still gets (approximately) the
same proportion of its much reduced imports from the U.S.14
111.2.2 What Does Latin America Import from the U.S.?
In the preceding subsection we looked at aggregate imports shares,and
found that in most cases the share of the dollar value of imports coming
from the U.S. has not exhibited a trend. In this subsection wedeal with
the question "What do these countries import from the U.S.?" Tables9
through 14 show, for six of the larger Latin American countrieshow their
imports from the U.S. were distributed across ten "categories", orsections
numbered from zero to 9, for years 1970 through1983.14 Each cell in each
of these tables indicate what proportion of that particular country's
imports from the U.S. correspond to that specific "category". Consequently,
except for rounding errors, these percentages add up to gnehundred across
each category for each year. These tables, constructed from data provided
by the U.N.'s Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA)also contain the
dollar value of total yearly imports for each country (column 1) as well as
15
total yearly imports from the U.S. (column 2). Categories 0 through 9












Food Stuffs and Live Animals
Beverages and Tobacco
Raw Non-Food Materials, except Fuel
Fuel and related products
Oil, greases and waxes of vegetable and animal origins
Chemical products
Manufactured products
Machinery and transport equipment
Other manufactured goods
Other commodities15
Two important patterns emerge from these tables. First, with almost no
exceptions, the bulk of these countrys' imports from the U.S. have been
concentrated throughout the period on the manufacturing sector (Categories
5, 6, 7 and 8) with capital goods (section 7) being in almost every country
the most important single item.
Second, in spite of the dominating role of manufacturing, there is a
clear decline through time in the relative importance of Category 7, in
almost every country. At the same time Categories 0 (Foodstuffs and live
animals) and 5 (Chemical) have increased their relative shares. This change
in the composition of Latin American imports from the U.S., away from
traditional labor intensive manufacturing industries and into natural
resources and capital (including human capital) intensive products (includ-
ing food, farm products, and chemicals), reflects a change in the U.S.
pattern of comparative advantage, which has been observed for some years
n9w. In fact, Learner (1984) has recently shown that, according to the
predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade, the U.S.
exports have shifted from being concentrated on relatively more labor
abundant commodities to more capital and resources abundant product.16
111.2.3 U.S. and Foreign Competition: Disaggregated Trends
In subsection 111.2.1 we looked at the Latin American aggregate imports
and their distribution across countries of origin. Subsection 111.2.2 dealt
with the question of "What do these countries import from the U.S.?" This
section tackles the equally important question of how the Latin American
import shares of different categories of imports are distributed among the
U.S. and other cauntries. Tables 15 through 18 provide disaggregated
information on the distribution of imports for the 12 upper middle income
and middle income Latin American countries for which these data are16
available. The disaggregation used here distinguishes between primary
products and manufactured goods. These tables contain datafor the years
1970, 1975, 1980, 1983 on the share of each of these categories thathave
been imported from:(a) the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean;
(b) the U.S.; (c) Japan;(d) Rest (i.e., other than U.S. or Japan) of
the OECD;(e) Soviet bloc (CAME); and (f) Rest of the World. In order
to know whether a given share represents a low or high dollar value, oneach
of these tables data on the dollar value of imports of each category is also
included (first column). These tables contain the most recent data
available and have been constructed from raw information obtained from the
U.N's Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA).17
The two commodities categories in these tables are defined in the
following way)8
-PrimaryProducts: Foodstuffs; live animals; beverages; tobacco; raw non-
food materials except fuel; oil, greases and waxes of vegetable and animal
origins (that is, Categories 0, 1, 2 and 4 as defined in subsection
111.2.2 above).
-ManufacturedGoods: Categories 5, 6, 7 and 8.
From these tables it is possible to detect some common patterns across
countries. First, perhaps with the exception of intra-Latin American
imports of manufactured goods, there are no drastic changes in the
distribution of imports between 1970 and 1983. A second interesting pattern
is that in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay a majority of imports of primary
products came for all these years, from other Latin American countries.
Third, the increased importance of imports of primary products from the U.S.
has been such that in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Nicaragua, El Salvador
and Honduras the U.S. has displaced other Latin American and Caribbean17
countries as the main providers of this type of goods. Moreover, by 1983
most of these countries imported almost half of their primary products from
the U.S.
The distribution of the imports of fuels has not been shown in these
tables, but behave as expected: The majority of the region's non-oil
producing countries import most of the fuel from oil producer Latin American
countries, with the rest of the world (mainly OPEC countries in this
instance) also being important.
The data on manufacturing imports are particularly revealing. They
show that in the majority of the cases the OECD as a whole (U.S., Japan and
the rest of OECD) lost ground to competitors from the south, and in parti-
cular to other Latin American suppliers)9 As can be seen from Tables 17
and 18 imports from other Latin American and Caribbean countries have
increased very significantly. Although Japan has in many cases made some
progress, its presence in the region is far from overwhelming. Moreover in
many countries the share of Japanese manufactured imports in 1983 was
substantially lower than its 1980 or even 1975 share (i.e., Argentina,
Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, Paraguay, Guatemala, Ecuador, Nicaragua,
El Salvador, Honduras and Bolivia). With regard to the U.S., in many of the
countries there is a decline in the share of manufactured imports, with
Mexico being the major exception.
IV. Latin American Exports and Protectionism in the Industrialized
Countries
In this section we deal with the behavior of exports in Latin America
during the last 15 years or so. As already noted, after the 1982 debt
crisis most Latin American countries implemented major adjustment programs
aimed at reducing the magnitude of their balance of payments problems. In18
the majority of cases these adjustment efforts have been largely successful;
in fact, as documented in Section III above in most countries both the cur-
rent account and trade balances have experienced drastic improvements
between 1980 and 1985. However, a fact many times overlooked is that for
the region as a whole more than 100% of the improved external situation has
been the consequence of the decline in imports; in many cases exports have
even declined in real terms between 1980 and 1985. For example,for the 14
countries in Table 2 real value of imports declined in 45% between 1980 and
1985 when the U.S. WPI is used as the relevant price index. On the other
hand, for the 13 countries for which there are data, the total real valueof
exports declined by almost 10% during the sameperiod.20 Of course, in
those countries where the real value of exports dropped, this was mainly the
result of the fall in prices of many of their countries principle exports.
The extent of this decline in relative export prices is captured in Table 19
on the evolution of the terms of trade.
There is little doubt that a definitive solution to the Latin America
pressing economic problems, and the resumption of growth in the regionwill
require a significant increase inexports.21 Moreover, only to the extent
that exports exhibit significant growth in the next few years will the
region be able to increase itsimports.22 A crucial question, then, is what
and to whom will Latin American export in the next decade or so. The
analysis that follows aims at providing some information that will help
answer this important question.
IV.l The Destination of Latin American Extorts
Table 20 contains data on the regional distribution of aggregate
exports for our 16 countries for 1970 through 1983. Tables21 and 22, on
the other hand, contain more disaggregated data on the sectoral distribution19
of exports destination for the 16 countries. Finally, Tables 23 through 24
provide information for the upper middle income countries on the distribu-
tion of exports destination of primary products and manufactured goods.23
A number of interesting facts emerge from these tables. First at the
aggregate level for the region as a whole (i.e., the 16 countries) there is
a decline in the proportion of exports going to the OECD. Exports to the
U.S., however, have not exhibited that much of a trend. It is also clear
from these tables that intra Latin American exports declined in a quite
substantial way in 1982 and 1983. Finally, another interesting trend
captured in Table 20 is the steady increase in Latin America's exports going
to Rest (i.e., non-Japan) of Asia and the Soviet bloc co,,tntries.
The data in Table 21 describe the evolution of the composition of
regional exports. Several facts emerge from this table. First, exports of
foodstuffs and agricultural products (Section 0) have declined steadily
throughout the period. Second, exports of fuel increased in importance both
as a result of the increases in the price of oil and of the increased gas
and oil production in the region. Third, manufactured exports corresponding
to sections 5 (chemicals), 8 (various manufactured products) and 7 (machin-
ery and transportation equipment) experienced an important increase. This
trend is captured in an even cleaner way in Table 22 that excludes full
fuel: whereas in 1970 Sections 5, 7 and 8 represented no more than 8
percent of nonfuel exports, in 1983 they accounted for 23 percent. Fourth,
these data also show that Section 6 (manufactures) has approximately
retained its relative importance accounting for around 19 percent of nonfuel
exports. The disaggregated information on the destination of exports in
Tables 23 and 24 shows that in the majority of the cases exports of primary
products go to the OECD.20
Table 24 shows that the proportion of the larger countries' exportsof
manufactured goods that go to the U.S. has increased through time.In most
cases this higher share of exports to the U.S. has comeout of declining
shares of exports to the rest of Latin America.
Table 25 contains data at an even more disaggregated level onthe
percentage distribution of the 16 countries exportsto the U.S. For each
year this table gives information onhow Latin American exports to the U.S.
are distributed across the 10 one-digit sectionof the SITC (see Section III
for a detailed definition of these categories). By and large,this table
confirms the patterns observed for total disaggregated exports reportedin
Table 22. First, the relative importance of food product exports (section
0) has declined steadily during the period. This, of course,is nothing but
another reflection of the changing pattern of comparative advantagesdiscus-
sed above. As the production of food has become more capital intensive,the
industrial countries and in particular the U.S., have tended to produce and
export more and more food, while the poorer countrieshave exported less and
less of it (Learner, 1984).24
IV.2 Protectionism in the Industrial Nations and the Future Evolutionof
Latin American ExDorts
While most Latin American nations have been going through serious
efforts aimed at improving their external balance, the industrial countries
have been invaded with protectionist sentiments. In fact, already inthe
past few years the industrial countries have used aseries of nontariff
mechanisms to impede a freer flow of Latin American goods. According tothe
GATT (1984) industrial countries currently use more than forty nontariff
measures to impede international flows ofcommodities.2521
A few authors have dealt with the issue of nontariff barriers,
analyzing the extent of these practices, their coverage across countries and
products, and their evolution through time.26 For example, in a comprehen-
sive recent study Nogues et al. (1986b) analyzed the use of nontariff
barriers in 16 industrialized countries.27 For the purpose of their
analysis they defined the following practices as nontariff barriers: prohi-
bitions, quotas, discretionary import authorization, conditional import
authorizations, "voluntary" export restraints, variable levies, minimum
price systems, "voluntary" price restraints, tariff-quotas, seasonal
tariffs, price and volume investigations, and antidumping and counterveiling
duties. Table 26 contains data on an index of the coverage of these non-
tariff barriers, defined as the proportion of these countries imports of a
particular product that are subject to the NTBs.28 As can be seen, the
coverage of this type of impediments is quite broad, affecting more than
one-fourth of all these countries imports, with textiles being the industry
most severely affected. An important question is whether imports from all
countries or regions are affected in the same way by the NTBs. Nogues et.
al. (1986) have shown that this is not the case; imports from the developing
world are more severely affected by this type of "semi-disguised"
protectionism than those from the industrialized world.
Once the effects of the NTBs are taken into account the degree of
protection the industrialized countries grant to some product can be quite
remarkable. Table 27, for example, provides estimates of the total average
rate of protection to which some Argentinian and Brazilian exports to the
EEC, Japan and the U.S. were subject in 1980. These figures are in many
ways staggering, indicating that in many cases the NTBs more than double the
tariff protection.22
Whatiseven more serious is that the existing evidence clearly
indicates a slow but steady increase in the degree of coverageof the NTBs.
For example Nogues et al. (l986a) found that the NTB5 coveragefor all goods
in the 16 industrial countries increased by 1.5 percentage pointsbetween
1981 and 1983. To the extent that these NTBs increase, or even if they are
maintained at their current level, it will become very difficult if not
plainly impossible, for the Latin American countries to increasetheir
exports at the rate required to solve the current debtcrisis. While the
main responsibility for increasing exports rests with the LatinAmerican
countries, their efforts, no matter how serious, can be easilyfrustrated by
the protectionist policies of the industrializedworld.29
V. Commercial Policies. Protectionism. and Latin American Trade
V.1 Historical Perspective
As noted in Section II, during the 1940s most of the Latin American
countries embarked on ambitious industrialization programs based on an
import substitution development strategy. This inward looking development
program was based on the idea that small developingeconomies would only
grow sufficiently rapidly if they were able to develop a largeand diversif-
ied industrial sector. This, in turn, could only be achieved if
sufficiently high protection in the form of import tariffs or quotas was
granted to the incipient domestic industries. Most proponentsof the import
substitution strategy also pointed out that the high degree of protection
would only be necessary as a temporary measure; after an initial learning
period these "infant industries" would move into their "adolescence,"and
would not require tariffs (Prebish, 1984). Reality, however, showed this
view to be wrong. In a way protectionism became a semi-permanent feature of23
the Latin American economies.
During the first years of the industrialization process, in a number of
the larger countries important heavy industries were created, as the bases
for a manufacturing sector were set. However, alongside with the indust-
rialization process an impressive array of restrictions, controls and often
contradictory regulations evolved. It was, in fact, thanks to these import
restrictions that many of the domestic industries were able to survive. For
example, a number of comparative studies have indicated that some of the
Latin American countries (i.e., Chile) had for a long time one of the high-
est, and more variable, structures of protection in the developing world.
As a consequence, many (if not most) of the industries created under the
import substitution strategy were quite inefficient. In an empirical study
directed by Krueger (1980), it was found that in Colombia, Chile and Uruguay
this inward looking strategy resulted in the use of very capital intensive
techniques, which hampered the creation of employment, among other
inefficiencies.
As in most historical cases, the Latin American import substitution
strategy was accompanied by an acute overvalued domestic currency which
precluded the development of a vigorous non-traditional export sector. In
particular in many of these countries the agricultural sector was seriously
harmed by the real exchange rate overvaluation. In fact in many cases the
lagging of agriculture became one of the most noticeable symptoms of Latin
America's economic problems of the 1960s. During the early and mid-1960s
the import substitution strategy began to run out of steam. At that time
most of the easy and obvious substitutions of imported goods had already
taken place, and the process was rapidly becoming less dynamic (Furtado
1969).24
Starting in the late 1960s, and during mostof the 1970s, most
countries made some movements towards rationalizing theirexternal sectors
via the reduction in coverage of quantitative restrictions,and reduction in
the average level of tariffs. In many cases theseliberalization efforts
were accompanied by active policies aimed at promotingexports. In a number
of countries these export promotion schemes were based on anactive manage-
ment of the nominal exchange rate, aimed at avoidingovervaluation, and thus
help maintain a steady growth in exports.
The Colombian experience is particularly interesting.After decades of
an almost chaotic external sector policy -- whereexchange rate crises were
the norm rather than the exception -- in1967 the Colomb.an government imp-
lemented a series of measures aimed at encouraging exportsand at reducing
the extent of protectionism. The exchange rate was devaluedsignificantly
and a crawling peg system based on periodic adjustmentsof the nominal
exchange rate was adopted. At the same time the percentageof commodities
subject to prior import licensing was drastically reduced, aswere the
average levels of tariffs. The exchange rateand import liberalization
policies were supplemented with a dynamic exportsubsidies scheme (the so-
called CATs). The Colombian experience was in many ways a big success.
Exports soared, new efficient industries were developedand the external
sector stayed extremely healthy, to the extent thatColombia was the only
country among the large and medium Latin Americannations not affected in a
traumatic way by the debtcrisis.30
Undoubtedly, the most ambitious attempts to liberalizethe external
sector took place in the Southern Cone during thelate l970s. Starting
around 1975 Argentina, Chile and Uruguay embarked on major programsto
reform their economies. These cases were particularly interestingsince the25
reforms implemented corresponded closely to what many economists have been
advocating for a long time: quantitative restrictions on trade were elimin-
ated, tariff levels and dispersion were reduced, domestic capital markets
were developed, and restrictions on international capital movements were
lifted. The main objective of these reforms was to transform these
countries into open export-oriented economies.
A decade after these reforms were first implemented, the evidence
indicates that they were to a large extent failures. In all three countries
the liberalization reforms have been partially reversed. Tariffs have been
raised, so that these economies are tending once again to become less inte-
grated with the rest of the world. Severe financial crises resulted in the
collapse and virtual nationalization of the banking sectors. Although this
is still an area of debate, it is possible to argue that the failure of
these liberalizations was, to a large extent (but not exclusively) due to
the implementation of inappropriate macroeconomic policies, including wage
rate and exchange rate policies. Also, the way in which the financial
reforms were implemented -- withlittle or no supervision on behalf of the
authorities --playedan important role in the final disappointing outcome.
A major indirect negative effect of the failure of the Southern Cone
experiences is that they have generated a bad press for import liberal-
ization and market-oriented policies in the rest of the region. The
collapse of these economies, the financial scandals, and the reversal of the
policies have given ammunition to those who, on political or other grounds,
oppose economic liberalization and tariff reform as a development strategy.
V.2 Tariffs and tiTrue Protection"
Table 28 contains data on nominal and effective import rates for
selected Latin American countries.31 Although these data refer to only a26
handful of countries, and in some cases to quite a few yearsback, they do
give a flavor on the extent and evolutionof protectionism in the region.
First, the effective rates of protection (or protectionto value added) are
extremely high. This is especially the case inthe 1960s and 1970s.
Second, for the cases of Argentina, Chile, Colombia,Peru and Uruguay these
figures reflect quite vividly the move towardstariff liberalization that
took place towards the late 1970s and early 1980s.
What is not reflected in this table, however, is the post-debtcrisis
(i.e., post 1982) generalized movement towards greater
protection in the
region. As these countries were forced to reduce imports,and improve their
external balance, they hiked their tariffs in a fairly significant wayand
imposed other forms of import controls. Even Chile,under the super-open
economy approach of Pinochet responded tothe crisis by (temporarily?)
increasing tariffs by more than 50% in1983.32
Tariffs, of course, constitute only one form of protection,and
countries in fact use a large number of other mechanisms tointroduce
facto wedges between domestic and world prices. As discussedin Section III
above, nontariff barriers can take many different forms rangingfrom prior-
deposits to outright quotas. The history ofnontariff barriers in Latin
America is long. As a number of authors have pointed out, importlicenses,
prior import deposits, and quotas have been quite generalized,in these
countries. Not surprisingly the use of nontariff barriers mechanism
increased significantly after the debtcrisis.33 In Colombia, for example,
the proportion of imports subject to an import license increasedfrom 47% in
1980 to 66% in l983.
Unfortunately the data available on NTBs in the developingcountries,
and in particular in Latin America are exceedingly sketchy. In fact, asfar27
as this author knows it is not possible to find for Latin America data on
the coverage of NTBs, which would be equivalent to that presented in Section
IV. However, a recent study by ALADI (1984) provides some indication of the
coverage of two forms of NTBs: outright prohibitions and prior import
licenses. Table 29 summarizes these data. As can be seen from this table
NTBs in Latin America are as prevalent, if not more, than in the developed
countries.
Multiple exchange rates are another mechanism used quite extensively by
the Latin American nations to impede trade flows. Interestingly enough,
studies on NTBs have not focused on this protective tool. In Section VI
below, however, we look into this problem in more detail.
The lack of reliable data on NTBs has generally frustrated analysts
that have tried to assess with some degree of rigor the extent of protection
in the developing world. For this reason in a recent massive cross country
study undertaken at the World Bank, an effort to construct subjective "in-
dexes of liberalization" was made. These indexes are supposed to capture
the extent of trade impediments, including tariffs and other NTBs. They are
subjective, in the sense that they don't combine actual objective measures.
Although there are some shortcomings related to this subjectivity, including
the nonverifiability and noncomparability across countries, their construc-
tion has been extremely useful, helping understand the evolution of "true
protectionism" in some of these countries. For the five Latin American
nations included among the 18 countries covered by the study, the indexes
reflect both the protectionist history of these countries, as well as the
efforts toward liberalization implemented in the late l970s and early 1980s
(see Michaely, Papageorgiou and Choksi, 1986).28
VI. Latin America's Exchanze Rate Policies and theExternal Sector
The purpose of this section is to briefly analyze the exchangerate
policies of the Latin American countries, placing especialemphasis on two
issues:(a) real exchange rate overvaluation, and (b)the protective
role of multiple and parallel (or black) market exchange rates.The
evolution of the external sector can be affected in several ways bythe
evolution of the real exchangerate.35 For example, real exchange rate
misalignment, and especially an overvalued real exchange rate greatlyharms
export performance (and in particular nontraditional exports),and encou-
rages capital flight. On the other hand a highlyvolatile real exchange
rate enhances uncertainty tending to reduce and even mislocateinvestment.36
VI.l Exchange Rate Policies. The Dollar and Real Exchange Rates
During the last 13 years or so the Latin Americancountries have
followed the most diverse nominal exchange rate policies, including fixed to
the dollar, crawling peg (i.e., periodic adjustments approximately deter-
mined by differential between domestic and world inflation), periodic
devaluations, preannounced declining rate of nominal devaluation and so on.
Surprisingly perhaps, in spite of these different policies, duringthe late
1970s and early 1980s a large number of countries experienced significant
real appreciations, which led to acute overvaluation of theircurrencies.37
In general, it is possible to single out three main causes for these
fairly generalized movements toward real overvaluation:(1) many of these
countries pursued expansive monetary and fiscal policies that became incom-
patible with the nominal exchange rate regime chosen (i.e., Mexico, Peru,
Argentina). In this case, the loose macropolicies result in expansionsof
aggregate demand which exercise upward pressure ondomestic prices. As
prices increased at a rate higher than the nominal rateof devaluation29
(which under fixed nominal rates is zero), the real exchange rate
appreciated and the country's exports became less competitive in
international markets.(2) A second cause for real appreciation, which
affected mainly the Southern Cone countries, was the adoption of
preannounced declining devaluation schedules, which started at rates below
the ongoing rate of inflation (i.e., the "Tablitas"). The combination of
these tablitas with other policies such as backward wage indexation in Chile
and relaxation of capital controls in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay conspired
to generate significant real appreciations in these three countries.38 (3)
A final and important factor that contributed to the loss in the region's
competitiveness was the significant appreciation of the dollar in
international financial markets between 1980 and 1985. Most of the Latin
American countries either peg their nominal exchange rate to the U.S. dollar
or use the dollar as a term of reference to conduct their exchange rate
policy. Consequently, as the dollar appreciated in the international
financial markets with respect to other industrial countries' currencies, so
did most of the Latin American currencies.39
Figures 4 through 7 depict the behavior of two indexes of real exchange
rate for Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Paraguay, Peru and Mexico. These
indexes were constructed using quarterly data and in most cases cover up to
mid-1983 or early 1984. The average for 1980 is equal to 100.40 In these
diagrams an increase in the indexes reflect real depreciation, while a
decline in the index denotes real appreciation on loss of international
competitiveness. The first index is the traditional bilateral real exchange
rate computed with respect to the U.S. dollar, and is called "off bilateral"
in the diagrams. The second index, called "off.multilateral" was construc-
ted taking into account, for each country, the changes in international30
competitiveness relative to a group of its ten most importanttrade
partners. In this way this multilateralreal exchange rate index is able to
take into account the way in which fluctuations among the partners'exchange
rates affect international competitiveness.
These diagrams neatly reflect some of the features of real exchange
behavior discussed above. First in all countries we observethat in the
mid- to late l970s a process of real appreciation, whichentailed a
reduction in the countries degree of international competitiveness,took
place. While in some cases this declining trend inthe RER was reversed in
the early l980s (Brazil, Chile, Peru, Mexico) via nominaldevaluations, in
others (Paraguay, El Salvador) it continued until at least1984. These
diagrams also reflect in a nice way the differencesbetween bilateral and
multilateral real exchange rates, as well as the effects of thedollar
appreciation in the first half of the 1980s. Notice thatin all countries
after 1980 the multilateral index declines (i.e., appreciates) muchfaster
than the bilateral rate, indicating that the degree of "true"overvaluation
-- whichtakes into account changes in the degree of competitiveness
relative to all trade partners -- wasmuch greater than that computed with
respect to the U.S. dollar only.
VI.2 Multiyle Exchange Rates. Parallel Markets and Protectionism inLatin
America
In manycases non-unified exchange rates play an important protective
role. To the extent that two types of international transactions are
subject to different rites of exchange, a wedge betweentheir prices, that
acts in the same way as a tax, will beimposed.41 Moreover, multiple
exchange rates for commercial transactions, willhave an effect equivalent
to import tariffs (or export taxes), since the domestic publicwill have to31
pay a higher price for those imports subject to a higher exchange rate.
It is important to note that in order for the exchange rate system to
play a protective role, it is not necessary that the authorities officially
adopt multiple rates. In fact, a parallel market for foreign exchange will
most times also have a protective effect. Generally speaking in many cases
marginal imports will be brought into the country at the higher parallel
market (or free) exchange rate.42
The Latin American countries have had a long tradition with multiple
exchange rates. In many cases -- asin Argentina and Colombia for example
-- alower rate has been applied to traditional exports as an implicit way
of taxing them. Also, in many countries, and for long periods of time,
different rates have been applied to commercial and financial transactions.
Perhaps the most extreme case is that of Chile in 1972, when 15 different
"official" exchange rates were in effect.
In fact in the 1980s multiple rates have become such a common place,
that in 1983 all but 3 of the Latin American countries for which there are
data had two or more official exchange rates. while in many of these
countries multiple rates have been a long term feature (Argentina, Colombia,
Paraguay, Ecuador), in many others they have only made an appearance (or
reappearance) in the early l980s, usually as part of the packages aimed at
dealing with the debt and economic crisis (i.e., Chile, Venezuela, Dominican
Republic). This profusion of multiple official rates, as well as the
significant parallel market premia observed in many of these countries
indicate that the extent of protection in Latin America is generally higher
than what data on tariffs, or even import licenses and quotas would suggest.32
VII. Direct Foreign Investment in Latin America
For many years direct foreign investment has been acontroversial issue
in Latin America. Most countries in the regionhave carefully regulated the
conditions under which direct foreign investment cantake place, and have
determined with even greater care regulations that govern profits
repatriations, reinvestment, transfer pricingand so on. Moreover, in a
number of countries regulations establish a time limitafter which any
foreign investment should be "nationalized",with at least 51% of the equity
belonging to locals. Perhaps the most severeof these regulations regarding
direct foreign investment was contained in Article24 of the Cartagena
Agreement which governed the functioningof the Andean Pact.43 According to
this regulation any foreign investment had to benationalized before 15
years.
Latin America's attitude towards foreign investment hasin many
instances been discriminatory and sector specific; whiledirect foreign
investment is welcomed in some sectors it is completely keptout of other
so-called "strategic areas". Good examples of this type of policy arethe
Brazilian and Mexican rejections of recent proposals to developU.S. owned
computer manufactures in thosecountries.44 Also the incorporation in the
Chilean constitution of the state ownership of all major copper (andother)
mines is quite striking.45
In spite of the "suspicious" attitude with which manyof the Latin
American countries have faced the subject, the direct foreigninvestment in
the region has continued to be quite substantial, with the U.S. beingthe
principal actor. Table 30 contains the latestavailable data on the
accumulated value of direct foreign investment in Latin America by country
of origin, Although these data -- asmuch of the information on direct33
foreign investment in the region -- arehighly incomplete, they reflect two
interesting facts. First, the U.S. has a very dominant role in the area.
Second, as far as this information can tell, the relative importance of the
U.S. declined between 1976 and 1981. In fact according to the data the U.S.
share in the accumulated value of foreign direct investment fluctuated
around 63-64 percent between 1967 and 1978; in 1981 the last year for which
there are data, this share was only 54 percent.
It is interesting to note that between 1982 and 1984 there was no
change in the value of U.S. investments in the region. However, 1983 was a
year of a fairly important net disinvestment, concentrated almost exclusive-
ly in Venezuela. In 1984 there was a net positive investment of almost the
same value as the drop of 1983. However, the geographical, as well as
sector composition changed quite drastically. While investments in Venez-
uela were minimum in 1984, they surged in Brazil. Also, oil saw a big dip
in 1984, with manufactures and commerce experiencing important increases.
Undoubtedly, the economic and political uncertainties of the last few
years in Latin America have dictated the relative stagnation of U.S. invest-
ment flows into the region. On the other hand the existence of abundant
natural resources and of substantial labor cost differentials still makes
the region a very attractive place for U.S. and other multinationals to
locate. For example, the data in Figure 8 suggests that the relative
differential between U.S. and local labor costs has widened since the mid-
l970s.46
In the aftermath of the debt crisis, direct foreign investment will
probably become very important for the Latin American countries. It is
clear that for a number of years to come the region will not be able to
obtain abundant (or even meager) funds from the international banking34
community, nor from the flotation of bonds. Consequently,additional funds
to finance increased capital accumulation and the resumptionof growth will
have to come from other sources. Of course, the natural alternativesources
of funds to finance investment are:(a) increased domestic savings (both
private and public);(b) reversal of the massive capital flight thattook
place in the early1980s;47 (c) increased funds obtained from multilateral
organizations such as the World Bank and the InteramericanDevelopment Bank;
and (d) increased direct investment.
Whether these potential sources of additional foreign funds will
actually become available will depend on a series of factors, includingthe
countries domestic policies. It is clear, however, that.with respect to
direct foreign investment, substantial increases in the flow of fundswill
require fairly creative policies by the Latin American countriesthat would
encourage these additional funds from abroad, while atthe same time would
allow these countries to maintain their main development and "national
objectives". In that regard, an interesting possibility wouldbe to link
any efforts to attract new direct foreign investmentto the opening up of
the "services sector". For example, in 1984 the U.S. accumulated direct
investment in the commercial banks, finance, insurance and real estate
sectors was only 11.9% of the total of theseinvestments.48
VIII. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed in detail a number of different aspects
related to the evolution and recent behavior of the U.S. trade relations
with the Latin American countries. In this section we wrap up the analysis
by summarizing our findings and by discussing the possiblefuture evolution
of the U.S. -Latin American trade relations. The main conclusions of this35
study are the following:
(1) When market import shares (computed using U.S. dollar values of
imports) are used as an indicator of competitiveness, there is no evidence
of a loss in the U.S. degree of competitiveness in Latin America in the last
15 years or so. In fact, the statistical analysis of the existing empirical
evidence shows that there has been no significant change in the U.S. share
of the aggregate Latin American imports markets since 1970.
(2) At the individual country level, however, there have been some
changes. In 9 countries the U.S. share of imports has not changed
significantly, in two it has increased, while in 5, including Nicaragua,
there has been a decline.
(3) Although at the overall aggregate level, there have been no
significant changes in the degree of U.S. competitiveness in Latin America,
there have been substantial changes in what the U.S. exports to these count-
ries. There has been a very important increase in Latin American imports of
primary products and of chemicals from the U.S., with a decline in imports
of other (traditional) manufactured goods. Thus, there has been an increase
in the "degree of competitiveness" of U.S. primary products and chemicals in
Latin America, accompanied with a loss in competitiveness of traditional
manufacturing sectors.
(4) Although the share of the U.S. in total Latin American imports has
not changed, the (real) dollar value of U.S. exports to the region has
declined very significantly in the last 3 or 4 years. This is because, as a
result of the debt crisis, every country in the region has gone through
major -- andin some cases highly innovative -- adjustmentprograms, which
have resulted in very important reductions in total imports. For the region
as a whole the real value of aggregate imports declined by more than 4536
percent between 1980 and 1985.
(5) The reduction in the real value of Latin America's imports in the
last years was a result of the contractionary demand policies implemented in
many countries, of important (real) exchange rate adjustments,and of the
imposition in many cases of fairly massive import controls. These import
controls --whichtake many forms, including higher tariffs, more general-
ized NTBs, multiple exchange rates, and parallel exchange rates --markan
important turn from a liberalizing trend observed, since the mid-l970s in
most countries in the region. It is clear that this mode of Latin American
adjustment is not sustainable in the long run. The resumption of growth
will require a rationalization of the external sector, increase in imports
and in exports.
(6) In terms of foreign competition, Japan has not experienced any
significant increases in its presence in the Latin American imports market.
At the manufactured goods level the drop in the U.S. share has been picked
up by other NICs (i.e., Korea, Taiwan) and especially by intra-Latin
American trade. In fact, CEPAL/ECLA projects a substantial increase in
overall intraregional trade for the next years.49 For example, in July of
1986 CEPAL/ECLA projected that the share of intra-Aladi imports would
increase from 16% in 1985 to 18.6% in 1990 and to 22.2 in 1994. Naturally,
if this happens other countries shares, including the U.S.'s, would decline.
Although we cannot discard ECLA's projections lightly, their numbers are
possibly on the high side, since their are based on the (fairly unlikely)
assumption of "desdollarization" of the interregional trade.
(7) A remarkable fact, and surprisingly not widely known, is that
practically all of the recent adjustment has come through a reduction in
imports, with the real value of exports having declined in many of these37
countries,mainly as a result of the reduction of prices of commodity
exports.
(8) There is little doubt that the recovery of the Latin American
economy will require an increase in exports and a rationalization of these
nations import sector, via reduced protection and increased efficiency.
This rationalization and easing of the current high levels of import
restrictions will probably come about slowly, and it is highly likely that
these countries, will proceed cautiously avoiding this time around, the
errors and mistakes of the recent Southern Cone liberalization. In that
regard, special care will be placed on avoiding exchange rate overvaluation.
(9) A sustained increase in Latin America's exports --whichis, of
course, a prerequisite for an increase in its imports -- requiresa number
of conditions. First, there has to be a steady increase in the demand for
these goods by the developed world. In fact, it has been recently estimated
that an average increase in industrial countries GDP of approximately 3% per
annum will be "required" during the next years (Balassa, et al. 1986).
(b) Increased efficiency in the regional productive process. This could be
achieved via a generalized increase in efficiency, including the rational-
ization of the external sector. (c) Avoiding real exchange rate
overvaluation and (d) More important, it is absolutely crucial that the
current protectionist trend in the industrial countries is reversed.
(10) The data presented in this paper indicate that at this time the
extent of nontariff barriers, as a form of protection in the industrial
countries, is very significant. Moreover, the data show that these NTBs are
particularly important for goods originating in the developing nations, and
that their tariff equivalents are in many cases very significant.38
(11) Although the U.S. is still the most important country regarding
direct investment in Latin America, its relative importance hasdeclined in
the recent years. Since 1981 the accumulated value of U.S. investmentin
Latin America did not change. However its sectoral and geographical compo-
sition did change, with oil and commerce being negatively affected.Both
from a point of view of resources and labor costs, Latin America continues
to be an attractive region for foreign investors. Moreover, inthe after-
math of the debt crisis, direct foreign investment has become one ofthe few
possible sources of foreign funds to finance capital accumulationand growth
in the region. Whether significant investments will in fact materialize
will depend on expected economic and political stability, and on innovative
changes in local regulations.
To sum up, then, the evidence examined in this paper suggests that the
U.S. overall competitive position in Latin America has not changed
significantly in the last 15 years or so. At the sectoral level, however,
the composition of U.S. exports to Latin America has changed, reflecting a
changing pattern of U.S. comparative advantage: chemicals and primary
products have increased their shares with traditional manufactures hurting.
Foreign competition in Latin America is not coming from Japan but fromother
NICs, and more importantly from intra-Latin American trade. As a resultof
the debt crisis the value of Latin American imports has greatly declined,
bringing down with it the value of U.S. exports to the region. As imports
recover, and move towards their peak (real) value, the U.S.will also
increase its exports to the region. A crucial point here is how will the
recovery of imports be financed? The answer is that possibly,in part by
higher exports -- thisin turn requires steady growth in the industrial
world and an end to the protectionist mood -- andpartially through new39
funds that will possibly be made available by increased direct foreign
investment. Naturally this increased foreign investment will only be
possible if existing legislation and regulations are reformed in an
innovative way.40
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1. These are the countries for which disaggregated data on directions
of trade are available.
2. On the evolution of Latin America's external sector see, for
example, Furtado (1969). On Latin America and the great depression see Diaz
Alejandro (1982, 1983) and Maddison (1985). On the development strategies
in Latin America, see Corbo (1986).
3.See, for example, the discussion in Furtado (1969).
4. See Blejer (1984).
5. On the Southern Cone see, for example, Calvo (1986), Corbo (1985),
Hanson and de Melo (1985), Edwards (1985) and Edwards and Edwards (1987).
6. An important issue refers to which external price index should be
used to compute the evolution of the real value of imports and exports. The
figure quoted above was calculated using the U.S. CPI. If instead the
wholesale price index for the industrialized countries as a whole, as com-
puted by the IMF, is used, Latin American imports declined by 49% on real
terms between 1980 and 1985.41
7. In some of these countries imports had also grown at a
fantastically high pace between 1975 and 1980 (i.e., the Southern Cone
Countries). Notice, however, for the 14 countries as a whole, the real
value of imports grew at a slower rate during 1975-80 than in the period
1965-75.
8. It should be noted, however, that both the trade-GDP and the
import-GDP ratios exhibit quite a bit of fluctuation from year-to-year. In
order to get a sense of the general trend in the degree of openness,
regressions of the log of both of these indexes on time were run for period
1960-83. The results show that in the great majority of these countries
openness increased during this period.
9. The decline of the trade ratio, however, is less marked than that
of the imports ratio. The reason for this is that as a result of the
adjustment program in some of these countries exports increased during the
period.
10. On the constant market-share criterion for assessing the degree of
international competitiveness see Learner and Stern (1970).
11. This can be illustrated using the following example. Assume that
a particular Latin American country imports goods from the U.S. and the rest
of the world. The Quantities imported are MUS and MR respectively. The
price of imports from the U.S. is pUSwhile the price of imports from R,
expressed in U.S. dollars, is EPR, where E is the nominal exchange rate
between the U.S. and the rest, and R is the price of MR in the rest of
USUS USUS the world currency. Our market share then is equal to s =[PM /(P M
+PREMR)]This can be rewritten as:s =(MUS/(MUS+(EPR/PUS)MRfl.
Notice that (EPR/PUS) is the real value of the dollar. Clearly, then,
even if MUS and MR -- thequantities imported -- remainconstant, changes42
R US
in (EP /P )willaffect s.
12. In Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Peru, and El Salvador the U.S.
share exhibited a slight increase between 1977 and 1982; in Brazil, Paraguay
and Nicaragua there was somewhat of a decline during the same period. In
the other countries the U.S. share fluctuated around a fairly stable value
during 1977-81.
13. The coefficient for the time trend turned out to be -0.004 with a
t-statistic of -1.2. In fact, Nicaragua is the only country with a signifi-
cant increase in imports from the Soviet bloc during the l980s.
14. Due to space considerations, detailed data for the rest of the
countries are not provided here. However, these data are available from the
author on request.
15. Given the different sources (IMF and ECLA) there are some (minor)
divergences between these figures and those in Tables 2.1 through 2.4. See
CEPAL Origen yDestinodel Comercio Exterior de los Paises de la Asociacion
Latinoamericana de Integracion ydelMercado Comun Centroamericano, Cuader-
nos Estdisticos de la CAPAL 9, Santiago, Chile, 1985 and "Origen y Destino
del Comercio Exterior en 1983," CEPAL, Santiago Chile, 28 August 1986.
16. The Heckscher-Ohlin theory predicts that, in general, a country
will tend to export those goods whose production process is intensive in the
factor that the country has a relative abundance (see Learner (1984)). Not-
ice that Learner's study covers only up to 1975. The data presented here,
then, confirms that Learner's results are also valid for the more recent
period.
17. See "Origen y Destino del Comercio Exterior, 1983,", CEPAL,
Santiago de Chile, 28 August 1986 (LC.L. 395).
18. This classification corresponds to ECLA.43
19. This of course is consistent with the shift in U.S. comparative
advantage detected above and documented in Section 111.2.2.
20. Not in every country, however, did the real value of exports
decline during this period. In Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico, for example, the
real value of exports was significantly higher in 1985 than in 1980. In
both cases the real values of imports and exports were computed using the
data in Tables 2 and 3 and the U.S. WPI as a price deflator for the nominal
dollar values. If, however, the wholesale price index for the industrial-
ized countries as a whole is used as the deflator, real exports of these 13
countries have declined by almost 18 percent.
21. For a comprehensive discussion on the role of exports in the
recovery of Latin America see the analysis in Balassa, Bueno, Kuczynski and
Simoensen (1986). Even in those quarters where there has traditionally been
skepticism regarding the role of trade, there is now agreement on the
importance of exports expansion in the next decade or so.
22. See, however, Section VII below for a discussion on alternative
possible sources of financing of new imports.
23. As in the case of imports these shares have been computed by
dividing the dollar value of exports to a particular country by the total
dollar value of exports.
24. Another interesting regularity is that the relative importance of
fuels exports (category 3) increased very dramatically during the period.
This rapid growth, of course reflects both increases in the prices of oil
prices (notice for example the jump of this share in 1979) and in oil
production. Naturally, the recent decline in the price of oil has had the
opposite effect on these shares.44
25. See CATT "Report of the Group on Quantitative Restrictions and
Other Non-Tariff Measures," Geneva, 1984.
26. See Balassa and Balassa (1984), Cline (1985), Jones (1983) and
Nogues, Olechowski and Winters (1986a,b).
27. Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
U.K., Australia, Austria, Finland, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, and the U.S.
28. Since the numerator in this index is actual imports, its value
will tend to be biased downward. For this reason Nogues et al. construct
alternative indexes, which is pretty much the same story as that presented
here.
29. In fact, in their recent blueprint for Latin Azuerican recovery
Balassa et al. (1986) stress that it is crucial that the industrialized
countries avoid any new import protection or export subsidization, "indeed
[what is required is] a renewal of trade liberalization" (p. 34). In that
regard it should be noted that the U.S. 1984 Trade and Tariff Act allows for
the possibility of implementing a series of protectionist measures. For an
analysis of the act from a Latin American perspective see Rodriguez Mendoza
(1986).
30. Of course, the coffee boom of 1975-79 and the boom in illegal
drug-related trade also helped. On coffee and the Colombian economy see
Edwards (l986a). On the Colombian external sector see Diaz Alejandro (1976)
and Thomas (1986).
31. The effective rate of protection is a measure of the relative
degree of inefficiency of domestic production relative to international pro-
duction. A positive value means that domestic value added for that
particular activity exceeds value added at international prices. The
effective tariff for good i (ri) is computed as =(t
-45
(l-Ea..), where t.isthe nominal tariff, a.. is the input/output
coefficient between input jandgood i, and tisthe nominal tariff
on input j.Noticethat if the good and ]Jinputshave the same nominal
tariff, then the effective and nominal rates of protection are the same (r.
= t.).
1
32.See Edwards and Edwards (1987, pp. 126-29).
33. See, for example, CEPAL "Reorientacion del Comercio Exterior de
Productos Basicos Hacia America Latina," LC/R.506 (Santiago, Chile, 25 June
1986)
34. See Edwards (1983).
35. The real exchange rate is a measure of the international
competitiveness of a country, and is defined as RER =EP*/P;where E is
the nominal exchange rate, and P* and P are foreign and domestic price
levels. An increase in RER represents a real depreciation and reflects an
increase in competitiveness.
36. On the effects of real exchange rate overvaluation in the
developing countries see, for example, Pfefferman (1985). On overvaluation
and capital flight see Cuddirigton (1985). A series of essays on exchange
rates in developing countries can be found in Edwards and Ahamed (1986).
37. Notice that since overvaluation is defined as a (significant)
discrepancy between the actual and equilibrium real exchange rate, not all
real appreciation necessarily reflect a situation of overvaluation. It is
possible that the equilibrium real exchange rate appreciates. For a fuller
discussion see Edwards (1987).
38. See Edwards (1984).
39. Balassa et al. (1986) for example, considers the dollar apprecia-
tion episode of 1982-85 as an important determinant of the debt crisis.46
40. For a detailed discussion on the construction of these indexes see
Edwards and Ng (1985).
41. There is an extensive technical literature on multiple exchange
rates. See, for example, Dornbusch (1986a).
42. For a general discussion on the role of multiple and parallel
rates in the developing countries see Dornbusch (1986a,b) and Edwards
(1987).
43. Even the ultra free market oriented Pinochet government in Chile
showed apprehension regarding direct foreign investment when the Mining Law
was enacted. (See Estudios Publicos, Summer 1986.)
44. On the Brazilian computer industry see Evans (1986).
45. The constitution allowed the state to grant concessions to foreign
firms. The nature of these concessions was regulated by the Mining Law of
1979, which included an ingenious system for calculating indemnization in
case of early termination of the concessions. See Pinera (1986.)
46. Of course these comparisons are highly sensitive to the exchange
rate used. To the extent that the Latin American countries succeed in
avoiding real overvaluation their real wages will remain relatively low by
international comparisons.
47. On the extent of capital flight see, for example, Cuddington
(1986).
48. This is significantly below its 1977 share of 25 percent.
49. CEPAL "Cooperacion Comercial y Negociaciones Regionales,"
LC/R.513; Santiago de Chile, 28 July 1986.47
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As % GDP 1984
TTnir Midd1 Tncom
Argentina 2,230 4.3 0.4 180.8 46.8 30
Brazil 1,720 9.8 4.4 71.4 44.0 27
Chile 1,700 3.4 2.7 75.4 100.2 21
Mexico 2,040 7.9 5.1 31.5 54.2 24
Uruguay 1,980 1.2 2.0 50.0 54.5





Paraguay 1,240 5.1 7.5 12.9 36.2
Costa Rica 1,190 7.1 2.8 24.1 114.0
Guatemala 1,160 6.0 3.1 9.4 7.0
Ecuador 1,150 7.2 4.8 17.8 75.1
Peru 1,000 3.5 1.5 56.7 162.0
Lower Income
Nicaragua 860 3.9 -1.1 13.0 7.0 25
El Salvador 710 4.4-0.3 11.3 9.0 16
Honduras 700 4.5 3.8 8.6 4.0 15










Evolution of Imports in Selected Latin American Countries:
1965-1985 (Millions U.S.$)
19651970 1975 19801982198319841985
Argentina 11991694 3946 105415337450445853814
Bolivia 134 159575 678 578 545 474 582
Brazil 10962849 13592 24961 21069 16801 15210 14346
Chile 604 941 13385123 3528 296831912742
Colombia 454 843 149546635478496844984141
Costa Rica 178 3176941540 889 98810941098
Dom. Rep. 97 3048891640144414711446 1487
Ecuador 151 27498722531989 146517161606
Guatemala 229 28473315981388 113512771175
Mexico 15602461 6571 19460 151278023 11788 13994
Panama 208 35789214491569 141219841423
Peru 729 622 255125003601254822121835
Uruguay 151 23155716801110 788 777 788
Venezuela 13931869 6004 11827 12944870975948178
Source: International Monetary Fund.TABLE 3




Bolivia n.a. 190444 942 828 755 725 673
Brazil 15962739 8670 20132 20175 21899 27005 25639
Chile 6371248 155246713710383636573797
Colombia 539 736 146539453095 308034613551
Costa Rica 112 2314931002 870 8821006 962
Dom. Rep. 126 249894 961 767 785 868 735
Ecuador 164 1909742481212822242583 2905
Guatemala 187 2986411557115311801127 -
Mexico 11201403 2904 15570 21214 21818 24407 22108
Panama 79 110286 361 375 321 276 335
Peru 6851034 1291389832933015 3147 2966
Uruguay 191 233 384105910231045 925 855
Venezuela 24552627 8800 19221 16499 15159 13971 12272
Source: International Monetary Fund.TABLE 4
Current Account Balance in Selected Latin American Countries:
1965-1985 (Millions U.S.$)
Source: International Monetary Fund.
19651970 197519801982198319841985
Argentina 222-163 -1287-4774-2353-2436-2495 -954
Bolivia -24 4 -130 -118 -94 -151 -179 -282
Brazil 284-837 -7008-12806-16312-6837 42 -273
Chile -43 -91 -490-1971-2304-1117-2060-1307
Colombia -21-293 -172 -206-3054-3003-1401-1390
Costa Rica -68 -74 -218 -664 -278 -317 -253 -374
Dom. Rep. 43 -102 -73 -671 -443 -418 -163 n.a.
Ecuador -19-113 -220 -642-1195 -104 -248 -85
Guatemala -35 -8 -66 -163-399 -224 -377 -246
Mexico -352-1068 -4042-8162-621853283966 540
Panama -100 -64 -169 -311 -51 247 -70 21
Peru - -22 -1541 62-1612 -875-223 53
Uruguay 72 -45 -190 -709-235 -60-124-108.1
Venezuela 35-104 21714728-4246442754182923*
Thisindex was constructed as the ratio of total trade (imports plus
exports) to GDP.
Source: Constructed from data from the International Monetary Fund.
TABLE 5
Openness Index in Selected Latin American Countries:
*
1965-1985
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
Argentitia - - 33.8 12.8 184a
Bolivia 40.2 33.6 41.4 30.9 146b
Brazil 12.5 13.7 19.3 21.0 20.2b
Chile 18.6 29.2 61.1 35.5 38.0
Colombia 22.0 22.5 23.8 27.2 21.0
Costa Rica 48.9 55.6 60.5 52.6 56.8
Doni. Republic 23.3 37.2 49.5 39.2 47.7
Ecuador 28.6 33.1 45.5 40.3 334b
Guatemala 31.3 30.6 37.1 40.0 256b
Mexico 13.0 10.9 10.81 18.9 13.3
Panama 43.6 45.7 64.0 50.8 37.4
Peru 33.0 26.6 31.4 41.9 31•6b
Uruguay 34.8 19.3 29.3 29.0 348b
Venezuela 45.2 38.3 53.7 52.4 516bArgentina
From:
TABLE 6
Upper Income Latin American Countries:
Distribution of Total Imports by Origin, 1977-1985 (percent)*
19771978 1979198019811982 198319841985
Industrialized65.867.565.068.269.162.865.058.1 62.7
- U.s. 18.818.621.122.622.235.120.218.5 17.5
- Japan - - - - - 12.8 6.7 8.2 6.6
Oil Exporting 5.9 2.4 3.0 5.6 4.5 3.3 .7n.a. n.a.




- U.S. 19.621.118.318.6 16.315.015.616.621.2







- Japan 11.0 7.57.67.210.66.5 5.9 9.0 6.0
Oil Exporting13.710.312.7 5.2 7.6 7.7 11.3n.a. n.a.




- U.S. 63.760.462.661.663.8 59.960.362.268.5
- Japan 5.4 8.1 6.5 5.1 5.0 5.7 4.4 4.2 5.6
Oil Exporting
Non-Oil LDCs
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2






Theseindexes were constructed as the ratio
each year's imports from a particular country (or
total imports.
of the dollar value of
group of countries) to












- Japan 11.0 9.6 8.2 8.0 8.0 9.8 5.7 5.2 5.2




Middle Income Latin American Countries:
Distribution of Total Imports by Origin, 1977-1985 (percent)
19771978 1979 198019811982 198319841985
- U.s. 35.2 35.239.639.534.434.634.534.2 39.3
- Japan 10.4 9.9 9.1 9.3 9.611.111.3 9.611.5
Oil Exporting 4.6 3.9 3.3 4.2 7.9 6.5 7.2n.a. n.a.




- U.S. 12.211.011.5 9.9 9.9 9.0 6.4 8.7 7.9
- Japan 9.0 7.9 8.2 8.1 8.3 5.5 4.211.9 4.6
Oil Exporting 9.310.912.0 7.4 7.413.013.7n.a. n.a.





- Japan 13.414.412.411.6 9.8 4.2 5.6 7.5 8.7
Oil Exporting 3.5 1.0 3.8 5.8 7.612.1 6.8n.a. n.a.




- U.S. 34.5,30.032.234.533.8 31.132.932.535.3
- Japan 11.410.68.28.07.75.24.65.14.5
Oil Exporting8.27.47.39.96.85.97.0n.a.n.a.







-Japan 18.416.111.311.8 11.712.4 6.913.6 11.9
Oil Exporting 0.6 0.4 0.6 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.8n.a. n.a.






OilExporting9.4 3.4 1.4 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.1n.a.
Non-OilLDCs 23.014.812.512.715.2 17.233.7n.a.n.a.
Source: See Table 3.7.Nicaragua
From:
TABLE 8
Lower Income Latin American Countries:
Distribution of Total Imports by Origin, 1977-1985 (percent)
1977 19781979198019811982 198319841985
Industrialized58.9 56.443.742.040.239.9 37.044.442.3
- U.S. 28.831.425.327.425.218.920.8 17.1 7.3
- Japan 10.16.9 3.8 3.2 1.6 1.4 1.4 2.0 4.1
Oil Exporting11.411.618.516.711.411.310.0n.a. n.a.





- Japan 11.011.8 7.9 3.9 3.42.8 3.3 4.34.2
Oil Exporting 9.3 7.611.125.2 4.1 3.6 3.0n.a. n.a.





- Japan 11.08.8 7.7 9.9 6.7 6.5 6.2 4.6 6.6
Oil Exporting 5.4 6.2 8.410.4 4.4 1.9 1.8n.a. n.a.





- Japan 13.413.3 9.7 9.711.911.0 3.6 3.4 8.7
Oil Exporting 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 - - - -
Non-Oil LDCs 35.928.9 33.232.638.636.144.2n.s. n.s.




Imports From The U.S
















































































































































19834503.0986.2 .005.001.046.038.001.328.101.413.068 0Source: CEPAL
Table 10
BRAZIL
Imports From The U.S
As A Fraction of Total U.S. Imports
category I TotalTotal
I $ $
World U.S. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 year
19702829.5915.9 .0750 .036.08 .003.196.129.43.050
1971 I3657.71040.6 .0930 .044.064 .007.2 .106.435.050
1972 I4715.11320.4 .0490 .044.0457.003.223.095.463.063.002
19736917.41982.4 .137.001.038.039 .004.191.128.408.053.001
1974 I14061.53401.6 .081.001.047.038 .011.237.179.364.0420
197513575.83379.1 .0930 .039.056 .004.234.108.42.0450
1976 I13748.23102.7 .0880 .039.057 .002.266.081.42.0470
197713567.32758.5 .0410 .042.067 .001.286.09.422.0510
1978 I15630.93423.5 .1610 .037.043 0 .262.079.369.0480
197920568.03994.3 .1230 .044.062 .007.279.084.35.050
198025601.24922.9 .1410 .034.06 .006.294.084.334.0470
198124768.54362.9 .2150 .033.056 0 .195.079.386.0450
198221958.53719.7 .1490 .038.088 .001.188.084.398.0520
198317293.12834.9 .1790 .032.099 0 .192.068.371.0580Source: CEPAL
Table 11
CHILE
Imports From The U.S
As A Fraction of Total U.S. Imports






U.S. 0 1 2
category
1970 I930.5 344.4 .051.01.019.034.018.117
1971979.4 267.2 .029.014.03.04.021.136
1972944.8 165.3 .069.007.103.04.006.189








1981I 6276.7 1530.3 .222.012.027.017.011.148
19823526.5898.7 .273.028.024.033.005.138
















Imports From The U.S
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Imports From The U.S























Imports From The U.S






U.S. 0 1 2
category
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
19701902.6 924.8 .10 .058.021.009.12.119 .509.063.001




























































































































































































































































































































Middle Income Countries : Imports
of Primary Products
Selected Years, 1970-1983




























































































































































































































































































































































































Middle Income Countries : Imports
Manufactued Goods
Selected Years, 1970-1983
Total L.A& U.S. Japan Rest of CAME Restof
$ Caribbean OECD World
0.474 0.072 0.355 0.023 0.013
0.414 0.096 0.375 0.012 0.019
0.378 0.128 0.329 0.024 0.034
0.299 0.153 0.368 0.034 0.035
0.195 0.106 0.439 0.006 0.028
0.133 0.082 0.268 0.005 0.018
0.113 0.15 0.215 0.008 0.042
0.315 0.077 0.091 0.003 0.028
0.36 0.108 0.292 0.004 0.018
0.376 0.112 0.246 0.01 0.033
0.369 0.153 0.21 0.007 0.034
0.211 0.078 0.425 0.003 0.055
0.332 0.117 0.277 0.002 0.007
0.372 0.115 0.277 0.003 0.01
0.416 0.121 0.238 0.004 0.033
0.21 0.071 0.38 0.005 0.029
0.444 0.097 0.348 0.021 0.011
0.363 0.167 0.316 0.009 0.023
0.362 0.147 0.295 0.024 0.053





























1970 I456.4 0.06 0.369 0.102 0.448 0.004 0.017
1975 I1638.6 0.103 0.314 0.109 0.444 0.018 0.012
1980 I1948.6 0.122 0.339 0.125 0.362 0.021 0.031
19831545.4 0.14 0.375 0.133 0.316 0.003 0.033
Source: CEPALTABLE 19
Terms of Trade Index:
Selected Latin American Countries (1970'=lOO)
1975 1980 1982 1984
Argentina 100.7 94.2 82.0 86.4
Bolivia 111.0 143.6 132.1 138.1
Brazil 85.4 67.4 54.2 59.5
Chile 53.2 49.0 35.4 34.5
Colombia 81.5 126.3 109.9 115.4
Costa Rica 85.5 97.3 90.0 84.7
Ecuador 159.0 237.6 196.9 177.7
Guatemala 70.8 94.2 72.1 70.1
Mexico 105.7 164.3 134.7 127.7
Peru 104.0 131.1 93.8 93.0
Uruguay 75.4 81.4 71.6 74.7
Venezuela 335.3 509.9 492.1 500.5
Source: CEPAL: Anuario Estadistico de America Latina y El Caribe
(Santiago, Chile, August 1986).TABLE 20
Destination of Exports: 16 Latin American Countries -- 1970-1983
(percent)
*The countries included here are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Source: United Nation's Economic Commission for Latin America.











REST 8.011.811.1 9.5 9.410.311.916.5 12.0 8.9
TOTAL100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0TABLE 21
Sectoral Composition of Exports for 16 Latin American Countries:
1970-1983 (percent)



































































































Sectoral Composition of Non-Fuel Exports of
*
16Latin American Countries: 1970-1983
(percent)
Section 1970 1975 1980 1983
0 50.1 45.2 41.9 39.6
1 0.7 1.4 1.1 1.5
2 19.5 20.1 17.4 14.2
4 2.2 2.0 2.5 2.3
5 2.8 4.0 4.7 5.7
6 19.7 15.4 18.4 19.3
7 3.1 7.7 10.0 13.0
8 1.8 3.8 4.3 4.4
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
*
Dueto rounding the sum across sections may not add up to 100.
Source: CEPALTable 23














































































































































































































Upper Middle Income Countries : Exports
Manufactured Goods
Selected Years, 1970-1983
ITotal L.A& U.S. Japan Rest ofCAME Rest of




























































































































































































Sectoral Distribution of 16 Latin American




0 44.330.1 36.436.535.730.826.222.119.7 17.3
1 0.4 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.40.6
2 10.9 9.5 8.0 5.4 5.9 5.2 4.7 5.4 4.04.0
3 25.644.3 37.639.436.044.652.051.555.0 48.5
4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.10.1
5 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.1 3.3 2.42.4
6 12.5 6.6 8.6 8.9 10.2 9.0 6.916.2 8.5 11.5
7 2.8 2.7 2.9 3.1 5.0 4.4 4.3 2.5 5.4 11.4
8 1.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 4.3 3.2 2.8 0.2 3.34.4
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00.0
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America.TABLE 26










• Iron and Steel 35.4
• Electrical Machinery 10.0
• Vehicles 30.4
• Other Manufactures 8.8
*
Thiscoverage index is defined as the proportion of these countries imports
subject to the following nontariff barriers: Prohibitions, Quotas, Discre-
tionary Import Authorization, Conditional Import Authorizations,
"Voluntary" Export Restraints, Variable Levies, Minimum Price Systems,
"Voluntary" Price Restraints, Tariff Quotas, Seasonal Tariffs, Price and
Volume Investigations, and Andi-Dumping and Counterveiling Duties.
Source: Nogues, Olechowski and Winters (1986).TABLE 27
Estimated Total Rates of Protection For Some




Fresh meat (011) 118 328 46
Wheat (041) 120 145 0
Corn (044) 63 n.a. 10
Textile Fibers (26) 59 13 68
Hides (611) 18 25 5
Steel (67) 43 8 35
Garments (84) 59 18 79
Brazil
Fresh Meat (011) 118 328 46
Sugar and Honey (061) 160 44 27
Coffee and Derivatives (071) 93 161 39
Cocoa (072) 12 173 4
Textiles (65) 59 13 68
Footwear (851) 27 16 9
*
Thenumbers in parentheses refer to the SITC classification. Total rate of
protection is defined as tariff rate plus tariff equivalent of NTBs.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America 'tRelaciones Economicas
Internacionales y Cooperacion Regional de America Latina y el Caribe,'t
Santiago de Chile (22 May 1986).TABLE 28
Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection
In Selective Latin American Countries
Nominal Rate Effective Rate
Yearof Protectionof Protection
Argentina
Manufacturing 1969 51.1 97.4
All Industries 1969 35.5 46.9
Manufacturing 1976 94.0 n.a.
Manufacturing 1980 53.4 n.a.
Brazil
Consumer Goods (Manufactured) 1967 n.a. 66
Capital Goods 1967 n.a. 52
Chile
Manufacturing 1974 n.a. 10.1
Manufacturing 1979 n.a. 13.6
Colombia
All Industries 1979 n.a. 47.6
All Industries 1981 n.a. 38.7
Peru
All Industries 1973 80.1 n.a.
Manufacturing 1975 n.a. 198
All Industries 1980 37.0 n.a.
Uruguay
All Industries 1974 452 n.a.
All Industries 1982 53 n.a.
Sources: Argentina: Cavallo and Cottani (1986)
Brazil: Carvalho and Haddad (1981)
Chile: Edwards and Edwards (1987)
Colombia: Edwards (1983)
Peru: Nogues (1986)
Uruguay: Favaro and Spiller (1986).TABLE 29
Coverage of Some NonTariff Barriers in Selected
Latin American Countries: 1983
Percent of Import Percent of Import
Items Subject To Items Subject
Outright Prohibition To Import Licenses
Argentina
• All Products 23 29
Brazil
• All Products 42 n.a.
• Textiles 93 n.a.
• Agriculture 86 n.a.
• Wood 80 n.a.
Chile
• All Products 0 0
Colombia
• All Products n.a. 60
Ecuador
• All Products 30 n.a.
• Agriculture 71 n.a.
Mexico
• All Products n.a. 82
Source: ALADI tElementos de Juicio Para el Estable cimiento de un Programa
de Negociaciones Para la Eliminacion de Restricciones No Arancelarias,"
ALADI/SEC/dt. at 60, 1984.TABLE 30
Accumulated Value of Direct Foreign Investment In Latin America
(by Country of Origin): Millions of U.S. $
1967 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1984
U.S.A. 11,777 23,934 27,514 32,662 35,056 38,882 38,864 28,094
Japan 4033,3013,7574,3735,0006,168n.a. n.a.
Germany (FR) 7533,4944,3814,674n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
U.K. 1,228 n.a. n.a. 1,995n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Canada 1,0932,287n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
OECD Total 18,453 37,740 43,293 50,550n.a. n.a.71,800n.a.
ALADI n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 590 654n.a.
Source: CEPAL, "Banco de Datos Sobre Inversion Extrangesan Directa en
America Latina y el Caribe," LC/L.386, Santiago de Chile, 9 September 1986.APPENDIX
TABLE A.l
Regression Results for U.S. Import Market Sharesin




Country Constant Trend Rate Lagged D.W.
Argentina 0.626 0.013 -0.044 -0.439 1.229 0.222
(0.292) (1.088) (-0.066) (-0.571)
Brazil 3.O6lQ* 0.046* 0.387 -0.470 2.572 0.975
(4.678) (-12.469) (1.824) (-1.890)
Chile 1.487 -0.009 -1.383 1.003 1.238 0.132
(0.398) (-0.442) (-1.143) (0.706)
Mexico 2.999* 0.009* -0.171 -0.059 2.173 0.598
(4.973) (2.603) (-0.877) (-0.258)
Uruguay 0.613 -0.009 -0.232 0.131 2.010 0.159
(0.246) (-0.677) (0.281) (0.971)
*
Venezuela 4.271 -0.005 -0.569 0.657 1.521 0.211
(3.798) (-0.887) (-1.564) (1.537)
* *
Colombia 4.354 -0.021 -0.176 0.287 1.805 0.647
(4.008) (-3.462) (-0.501) (-0.696)
Paraguay -1.659 0.061* 0.354 -1.331 1.377 0.814
(-0.557) (-3.608) (0.367) (1.175)
*
CostaRica 1.984 0.001 -0.389 0.065 1.475 0.388
(2.521) (0.305) (1.525) (0.219)
Guatemala 3.453 -0.004 -0.577 0.560 1.749 0.278
(3.742) (-0.676) (-1.929) (1.598)
*
Ecuador 3.023 -0.005 -0.179 0.043 1.041 0.144
(2.758) (-0.757) (0.505) (0.103)
* *
Peru 3.480 0.027 0.395 -0.359 1.254 0.658






Country Constant Trend Rate Lagged D.W. R
Nicaragua 7.534 0.045* 0.063 0.182 2.674 0.901
(6.311) (-6.680) (1.627) (0.402)
El Salvador 3.017 -0.002 0.680 -0.753 1.091 0,378
(2.334) (-0.232) (1.625) (-1.532)
Honduras 5.211 -0.0ll' 0.067 0.227 1.539 0.435
(5.816) (-2.147) (0.237) (0.665)
Bolivia -1.365 0.009 0.274 -1.238 1.940 0.428
(-0.760) (0.904) (0.470) (-1.813)




log USRERt +a3log USRERt 1 + Thedata on real exchange rates
correspond to (the inverse) of the IMF MERM indexes.
The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, D.W. is the Durbin-Watson
statistic, R2 is the coefficient of determination. All asterisks mean
that the coefficient is significant.F
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